The overarching theme of causality in behavioral genetics is discussed on epistemological grounds. Evidence is offered in favor of a continuum spectrum in causality, in contrast to discrimination between causal factors and associations. The risk of invalidating exploratory studies in behavior genetics is discussed, especially for the potential impact on those fields of medicine interested in complex behaviors.

: In this paper I offer some criticisms of Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. In Dancy’s version moral particularism states that there are neither general nor universal moral principles, that moral action is not the application of principles to particular cases, that moral reasoning has no motivational force because it deduces what must be done by moral principles, and that the agent who acts morally is not a person who has moral principles. However, Dancy’s proposal fails to explain the regularity of (...) moral behavior and the function of stability that moral agents and moral psychology play within social cooperation, nor is it able to explain the possibility of moral progress. Keywords: Jonathan Dancy; Moral Progress; Moral Psychology; Principles; Cooperation La mente morale particolarista Riassunto: In questo articolo espongo alcune critiche al particolarismo morale di Jonathan Dancy. Nella versione di Dancy il particolarismo morale afferma che non ci sono né principi morali generali né universali, che l’azione morale non è l’applicazione di principi a casi particolari, che il ragionamento morale non ha forza motivazionale perché deduce ciò che deve essere fatto dai principi morali, e che l’agente che agisce moralmente non è una persona che ha principi morali. Tuttavia, la proposta di Dancy non riesce a spiegare la regolarità del comportamento morale e la funzione di stabilità che gli agenti morali e la psicologia morale svolgono all’interno della cooperazione sociale, né è in grado di spiegare la possibilità del progresso morale. Parole chiave: Jonathan Dancy; Progresso morale; Psicologia morale; Principi; Cooperazione. (shrink)

Quali opzioni filosofiche contrassegnano il realismo? La questione della conoscenza del reale appartiene al pensiero filosofico di ogni tempo: nei dibattiti filosofici contemporanei essa si accende di varie tonalità, per il moltiplicarsi di forme di realismo e antirealismo. Il problema di fondo è se, conoscendo il reale, siamo consapevoli di ciò che comporti affermarsi conoscenti in termini personali e culturali. Quali concezioni della cultura possono accompagnare il sapere? Come affrontare i problemi attinenti al dialogo tra discipline? Il sapere, contrassegnato da (...) rivoluzioni scientifiche e da trasformazioni storico-culturali, può ancora ricomporsi attorno a un metodo? Quali attenzioni richiede il pluralismo delle culture? Domande e risposte di carattere epistemologico e metodologico s’intrecciano nel presente volume: esse sono state elaborate scavando soprattutto in alcuni contesti culturali contemporanei e attingendo alle proposte provenienti dal pensiero di B. Lonergan. Le esplorazioni presenti in ciascun capitolo appartengono a una ricerca interdisciplinare, criticamente affrontata da docenti universitari che hanno selezionato peculiari nuclei problematici, rappresentativi di alcune sfide attuali sui versanti del sapere. Contributi di: Carlo Cirotto, Valter Danna, Rosanna Finamore, Pasquale Giustiniani, Paolo Gherri, Giuseppe Guglielmi, Pierpaolo Triani. (shrink)

The time marked by the clock hands, the so-called “objective time,” is deeply different from the one perceived by the individual. Starting from this hypothesis, directly connected to the subjective modality of “living” the time and defined as time perspective, we will try to understand how much it affects the various domains of people's lives, attitudes, and experiences. Therefore, the research investigates whether all our decisions can be influenced by one or more time perspectives beyond our awareness. Last, but not (...) least, we will try to understand if some time perspectives in specific contexts are more functional and adaptive than others. (shrink)

For many years, psychological–clinical research has been aiming at studying the Mafia from different viewpoints: the man of honor's inner world, relational and psychopathological structures of his family matrices, connections between inner and social worlds, interiorized and social rules. Today, however, a complex phenomenon has come to light, which concerns the great connection between the Mafia and financial crime, and for us as researchers it is very interesting and complicated to analyze, because it involves the study of psychological peculiarities that (...) can be specifically found in the numerous illegalities. The crossbreeding of the various criminalities, which are always more interacting and merging and less isolated, makes this picture even more complex. (shrink)

The human being can be divided into body and mind, two inextricably linked aspects influencing each other. From birth, the body is the site of emotional experiences thanks to cellular memory. The t...

In his classic introduction to the subject, Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders, Aaron Beck observes that “the philosophical underpinnings” of cognitive therapy’s (CT) approach to the emotional disorders “go back thousands of years, certainly to the time of the Stoics, who considered man’s conceptions (or misconceptions) of events rather than the events themselves as the key to his emotional upsets” (Beck 1976, 3). But beyond acknowledging that the stoics anticipated the central insight of CT, Beck has very little to (...) say about the philosophical underpinnings of CT, content it would seem for it to be an empirically grounded system of psychological principles and therapeutic methods. Yet even this little .. (shrink)

The recent in vitro derivation of gamete‐like cells from mouse embryonic stem (mES) cells is a major breakthrough and lays down several challenges, both for the further scientific investigation and for the bioethical and biolegal discourse. We refer here to these cells as gamete‐like (sperm‐like or oocyte‐like, respectively), because at present there is still no evidence that these cells behave fully like bona fide sperm or oocytes, lacking the fundamental proof, i.e. combination with a normally derived gamete of the opposite (...) sex to yield a normal individual. However, the results published so far do show that these cells share some defining features of gametes. We discuss these results in the light of the bioethical and legal questions that are likely to arise would the same process become possible with human embryonic stem (hES) cells. (shrink)

Contrary to the fairly standard view of Aquinas on temperance according to which this virtue habituates the concupiscible appetite to move in ways that accord with reason spontaneously, that is, independently of any immediate command from reason, the author of this paper argues that temperance is a virtue which "(1) disposes the concupiscible appetite to remain more or less still in the absence of any command from reason to move, thus preventing vehement, spontaneous passions of any sort, ordinate or inordinate, (...) from arising in the concupiscible appetite prior to reason's immediate command; and (2) also disposes the concupiscible appetite to obey reason's command so that a person may incite, increase, decrease, or curb a passion as needed." The paper ends by noting a lacuna in Aquinas's teaching on temperance. (shrink)

Francisco Suárez’s thought has often been interpreted as paving the way for early modern philosophy, and causation is one of the themes in which his name is regularly associated with modern ideas. This is, however, an extrinsic relation – despite our lamentably poor knowledge of early modern scholasticism, Suárez’s doctrines can only be properly understood in relation to their proximate scholastic context. This article attempts a reevaluation of the importance of this context through an analysis of the definition of ‘cause’ (...) in early modern scholasticism, focusing on the influence of Jesuit authors such as Toledo, Perera, and Fonseca on Suárez’s famous definition of ‘cause’, often considered as an anticipation of Descartes’ reduction of causality to efficiency. As it turns out, the proximate context of this definition provides not only the debate to which Suárez responds, but also the common conception of causality that Suárez tries to define more properly than his predecessors. (shrink)

We review here some recent data about glucose‐6‐phosphate dehydrogenase (G6PD), the first and key regulatory enzyme of the pentose phosphate pathway. New evidence has been presented to suggest that malaria is a selective agent for G6PD deficiency, which is the most common enzymopathy in man, and that G6PD deficiency, generally considered to be a mild and benign condition, is significantly disadvantageous in certain environmental conditions. At the molecular level, the enzyme structure has recently been elucidated and mechanisms regulating G6PD gene (...) expression have been determined. A G6PD knock‐out mutation introduced in mouse cells makes them exquisitely sensitive to oxidative stress, indicating that this ubiquitous metabolic enzyme has a major role in the defence against oxidative stress, even in eukaryotic nucleated cells, which have several alternative routes for providing the same protection. Because of the high prevalence of G6PD deficiency in many populations, it is expected that these findings will prompt further studies to ascertain the putative role of G6PD deficiency in conditions such as carcinogenesis and ageing. (shrink)

Through the analysis of the contents of the most recent and popular teen dramas, of the diffusion of online pornography and of data from surveys on adolescent sexuality, we hypothesise how today's adolescents live an increasingly carefree sexual behaviour with respect to the choice of sexual objects, more free from ethical and social norms, in a completely changed relationship with an adult world no longer seen as a more or less controversial reference point. This panorama urges us to renew the (...) theoretical lenses through which we look at an adolescence that is completely different from previous ones with regard to its relationship with sexuality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Second Harvest: Further Reflections on the Promise of the Thomistic PsychologyGiuseppe Butera (bio)Keywordsmethod, emotion, developmental psychology, rationalism, holismSamuel Johnson was once accosted by a lady demanding to know why he had defined “pastern” as “the knee of a horse.” Seeing perhaps that escape was impossible, the great man simply confessed, “Ignorance, madam, pure ignorance” (Fadiman 1985, 312). In preparing to write my response to the gracious and stimulating commentaries (...) of Eugene DeRobertis and Christopher Megone, I came gradually to feel how apposite such a reply would be to some of their own critical observations and remarks. Although I had known from the start that the work of bringing Aquinas’s philosophical psychology (APP) into dialogue with modern psychology would be difficult, it was only in reflecting on their commentaries that I came to appreciate just how difficult it would be and how far short of the mark my own first attempt had fallen. But there was also much in their commentaries to encourage me in this work. For their penetrating observations and criticisms, as well as their supportive comments, I am truly grateful.Rather than responding to their critical remarks one at a time and in the order in which they appear in their respective commentaries, I would like to treat them thematically. Taken together, DeRobertis and Megone seem to have three major concerns, each of which will be treated separately in the following sections. Very briefly, these concerns have to do with: (1) Claims I make about the difference between the methods of inquiry employed by philosophy and psychology; (2) the absence of a discussion of the importance of developmental psychology for an adequate philosophical understanding of judgment (of both the rational and the cogitative kinds) and its relation to emotion; and (3) a subtle rationalist/cognitivist tendency in my treatment of Aquinas’s understanding of human rationality that comes dangerously close to muting, almost to the point of denying, its decidedly un-Cartesian embodiment.On MethodAlthough I did not undertake to argue for the legitimacy of philosophical inquiry into matters nowadays viewed by many to be the exclusive domain of the sciences—among which psychology is often numbered—I did make a few passing comments in that direction. Unfortunately, in the process of doing so, I ended up reducing the variegated field of psychology, with its wide range of explanatory stances and research methodologies,1 to the highly restrictive quantitative methodology [End Page 377] employed by the hard sciences.2 There is no question in my mind that DeRobertis would be right to call my “characterization of psychology as a strictly quantitative science” “damning” (DeRobertis 2010, 370) were I unwilling to disavow it.Admitting DeRobertis’ point that psychology is not limited to using a strictly quantitative research methodology is not, however, to deny that there is a real difference between the approaches taken by philosophy and modern psychology in their separate attempts to understand the human psyche. Although it is no simple task to say in what this difference consists, some indication of its nature may be grasped by answering questions in Megone’s commentary that invite a careful examination of “the linked roles of reason and experience in both science and philosophy” (Megone 2010, 374).Although Megone asks three distinct questions, the answers to the first two may be subsumed under the answer to the third, which asks how the “interaction of the two different modes of inquiry [employed by APP and CT]” may “be explained, given their different methods” (Megone 2010, 374). How, in other words, is it possible for cognitive therapy (CT) to be queried by APP, and vice versa, given their methodological differences? To answer this question, we must clarify what it is about modern psychology that makes it different from philosophical psychology (the first question); we must also say something about the “linked roles of reason and experience in both science and philosophy” (the second question).Generally speaking, philosophical psychology, at least as it is found in the writings of Aristotle, Aquinas, and other philosophical realists, differs from modern psychology not so much in the kinds of questions it asks as in the kinds of answers it seeks... (shrink)

Alexandra Pârvan's appropriation of Augustine's metaphysical distinction between self and action is both creative and laudable. It surely has the potential to add an important element to the treatment of both victims and perpetrators of violence by helping them to change negative self-models that puts them at risk "for both receipt and perpetration of relationship violence". What I would like to do is suggest ways that this potential might be increased i) through a more refined understanding of Augustine's distinction between (...) self and action, and ii) through the appropriation of later medieval developments in philosophical psychology, developments that find their classic formulation in the... (shrink)

All processes of measurement imply symmetry?breaking. Ambiguity is the coexistence of mutually incompatible aspects of the same structure. There are many examples of analogy and symmetry breaking in nature and in culture.

The history of the relationship between Jerome and Augustine has often been studied; nevertheless it seems that, even after peace was made between the two, the Stridonian advanced some criticisms of Augustine in relation to the evangelical saying about the camel and the eye. He interprets this as an expression of an absolute impossibility, while for Augustine it indicates only the difficulty of an operation which can be overcome thanks to the intervention of God.

"El método seguido puede llamarse con una sola palabra comparativo. He tratado, en efecto, de que las ideas y los hechos procedan a la par, ayudándome también a veces del estudio de los vocablos, con los cuales las unas y los otros han sido expresados; he hecho que caminasen de frente los varios pueblos que concurrieron más eficazmente al desenvolvimiento de las instituciones jurídicas y sociales, así como también a los diferentes sistemas escogidos por los autores, y he procurado, por (...) fin, poner de relieve la correlación constante entre la vida económica, jurídica y moral en los distintos períodos de la historia y el concierto admirable que siempre se manifiesta entre las varias partes del organismo social. Presento este ensayo tal como ha llegado a ser después de varios años de trabajo y estudio, debiendo limitarme a hacer observar que, por razón de la lógica que lo rige, las varias partes de que consta se suponen recíprocamente por modo tal, que los primeros capítulos son la preparación indispensable para la inteligencia de los siguientes, y los últimos sirven de ilustración y complemento a los primeros. Por mi parte habré alcanzado el objeto que me proponía si logro infundir en alguno de mis lectores la profunda convicción que tengo de que el estudio del mundo social y humano ofrece tantos goces y no menores maravillas al sociólogo, como al físico y al naturalista el estudio del mundo material y orgánico, y que las investigaciones libros y sin prejuicios acerca de las instituciones primitivas de la sociedad, lejos de conmover las eternas convicciones del género huma-no, logran al fin confirmarlas científicamente". Giuseppe Carle. (shrink)